Thank you for expanding on what I thought I vaguely recalled. Regarding your upcoming piece on advances in trench warfare, I would also be interested in hearing any comments you might offer on the latest iteration of trench warfare in the Ukraine-Russia War, inasmuch as aerial surveillance and precision targeting mean that slit trenches offer little protection against modern weaponry.
I believe I read (somewhere, a long time ago) that the majority of battlefield casualties in the Great War were the result of artillery fire, with airbursts particularly effective in killing soldiers while they were in the trenches (though I suppose poison gas was also a major cause of injury or death in the trenches). Is that right? Is that why equipping armies with high-trajectory artillery was important?
The light, rapid-fire field guns like the famous "French 75" that predominated in 1914 were flat-trajectory weapons. Firing shrapnel shell against troops in the open, they were effective enough, but much less so against troops in field fortifications. Nor could they search out dead ground, e.g. terrain behind hills, buildings, etc. For that kind of work, howitzers were far superior.
You're correct that artillery was the great killer in WW I—and, for that matter, in WW II. As the series progresses, there will be more on this, e.g. a special study article on the evolution of trench warfare from 1914 to 1918.
What always amazed me was that the armies did not come apart when expectations met reality - massive firepower, horrendous casualties, and the failure to meet objectives.
Commentary on military discipline and the fortitude of those soldiers.
French in May 1917, and British in the spring of 1918. The Russian army completely fell apart in the summer and fall of 1917. As Keegan wrote, about 3 years or a little more, was the limit.
Such were the armies that marched in August 1914—confident for the most part that the war would be over by Christmas.
Once the cannons start shooting ... there is no way to know where it will lead and when it will end.
Thank you for expanding on what I thought I vaguely recalled. Regarding your upcoming piece on advances in trench warfare, I would also be interested in hearing any comments you might offer on the latest iteration of trench warfare in the Ukraine-Russia War, inasmuch as aerial surveillance and precision targeting mean that slit trenches offer little protection against modern weaponry.
I believe I read (somewhere, a long time ago) that the majority of battlefield casualties in the Great War were the result of artillery fire, with airbursts particularly effective in killing soldiers while they were in the trenches (though I suppose poison gas was also a major cause of injury or death in the trenches). Is that right? Is that why equipping armies with high-trajectory artillery was important?
The light, rapid-fire field guns like the famous "French 75" that predominated in 1914 were flat-trajectory weapons. Firing shrapnel shell against troops in the open, they were effective enough, but much less so against troops in field fortifications. Nor could they search out dead ground, e.g. terrain behind hills, buildings, etc. For that kind of work, howitzers were far superior.
You're correct that artillery was the great killer in WW I—and, for that matter, in WW II. As the series progresses, there will be more on this, e.g. a special study article on the evolution of trench warfare from 1914 to 1918.
Excellent description.
What always amazed me was that the armies did not come apart when expectations met reality - massive firepower, horrendous casualties, and the failure to meet objectives.
Commentary on military discipline and the fortitude of those soldiers.
Eventually some of the armies did come apart, or nearly so: the Russians, the French, the Italians, even the Germans.
French in May 1917, and British in the spring of 1918. The Russian army completely fell apart in the summer and fall of 1917. As Keegan wrote, about 3 years or a little more, was the limit.