Somewhere I read that that German advance through the Ardennes was over-extended, and that there was in the end a slugfest of exhausted forces, with the Germans finally prevailing. Why? Because though both sides were exhausted, the Germans were running on meth. The tanks were out of gas, but the soldiers themselves were not. In a battle where the battered victor is the last man standing, amphetamines are a real advantage. There is a story in these parts about a disagreement between two Bedouin clans. The two family heads agreed on a solution not involving all-out conflict. Each would stick his finger in the other's mouth. Both would then chomp down on the other's finger and the first to succumb to the pain loses. Chomp they did, and surrounding observers could not believe how they withstood the pain for so long. Finally, one broke away and walked away in defeat. The crowd surrounded the victor and accompanied him to his tent in song and dance. As soon as he closed the flap to his tent he sat down nursing his hand. His son asked him: "Father, how did you withstand the pain?" His father answered: "It hurt like hell, but I knew that it was hurting him to the exact same extent. The truth is that had he held out for one more second, it would have been me pulling away first."
The Arabs appreciate the advantage of a drugged fighter: No fear, no need of nourishment, blind following of orders, and an ability to strike fear and despair upon an enemy through inhuman acts of terrorism.
One of the great ironies is the French military command after 1945 and DeGaulle's self imposed exile to Colombey-les-Deux-Églises once AGAIN tried to rebuild the Maginot Line thinking it would have relevance then to the Cold War. It was only after DeGaulle's return in 1959 and France's first nuclear test that the Maginot Line was once and finally scrapped for good. Remember a lot of the French military command OTHER than DeGaulle from 1945 to 1960 collaborated under Vichy initially and did not follow DeGaulle in 1940.
There is a great documentary from France Television featuring Francois Heisbourg among others discussing the huge changes in French military NOT after 1945 but only after 1960 and the advent of French nuclear weapons and just how overwhelmingly they were compared to the past.
Now the fact there was a period of time after the war but before the first French nuclear test that the Maginot line was still considered valuable perhaps showed that the original idea wasn't quite as bad as historians now make it out to be.
When Rommel came to the Meuse near Dinant, he found a bridge intact, with the French artillery on the heights above. He couldn’t believe his luck and rushed his tanks across the river, all the while expecting the French to wake up and wreck his plans. They never did (they were awaiting orders that never came). It was luck like this that favored the Germans throughout the campaign.
As for the French reaction, many saw Hitler as the savior of what they regarded as a hopeless societal malaise. Many others, my nanny among them, wanted no part of the fight between the foreigners and the French oligarchy. She owned a cafe frequented by resistance terrorists and the site of multiple German reprisals, yet like many, she never picked a side in a war that had nothing to do with her.
History is written by the victors and rarely resembles actual events. Events tend to be sloppy and messy and are almost never resolved one way or the other. But if we’re going to celebrate myths, you can’t do much better than the Allied version. Just don’t fight your next war on that basis.
Interesting, but I cannot see any resemblance between France in 1940 and USA now. True, both nations are overwhelmed be defeatism, but the Americans want to surrender Ukraine and Taiwan without a fight. Much more like Munich in 1938.
Well, as I mentioned in my prefatory note, most of the factors bearing on France's defeat in 1940 were those commonly found in the annals of military history. While I suppose that the general malaise of French society exacerbated some of those factors, there was nothing unique about them. That was my main point. The British, for example, made much the same mistakes when it came to the role of the tank.
It was the French people's reaction to that defeat that revealed the larger problems. Also, I wanted to clear away some of the misconceptions about the 1940 Battle of France, concerning such things as the role of the Maginot Line and how well the French Army fought.
The French political factions may have hated each other as much as they feared the Germans.
The political infighting from Munich to May, 1940 prevented a consensus - a focusing of the national energy.
I also got the sense that French communists were somewhat halfhearted in fighting the ally of Russia.
It seems that the very significant French defense budget didn't get the "bang for the buck", eg multiple airplane types with little standardization and a formidable navy that played no role in the war.
I wasn't impressed with the quality of French generals - with the exception of a few mid-level generals, there weren't as many "fighting generals" as a 1MM+ man army needed.
My sense is that the French defeat was due to a whole series of factors being negative at the same time. France may have overcome most of the negatives, but they lacked the leadership to bring the country together. I never heard a French version of "We shall fight on the beaches...".
And credit is due to the Germans, who fought well, had good tactics, competent generals, and got lucky. Few armies could have defeated the German army in May, 1940.
Somewhere I read that that German advance through the Ardennes was over-extended, and that there was in the end a slugfest of exhausted forces, with the Germans finally prevailing. Why? Because though both sides were exhausted, the Germans were running on meth. The tanks were out of gas, but the soldiers themselves were not. In a battle where the battered victor is the last man standing, amphetamines are a real advantage. There is a story in these parts about a disagreement between two Bedouin clans. The two family heads agreed on a solution not involving all-out conflict. Each would stick his finger in the other's mouth. Both would then chomp down on the other's finger and the first to succumb to the pain loses. Chomp they did, and surrounding observers could not believe how they withstood the pain for so long. Finally, one broke away and walked away in defeat. The crowd surrounded the victor and accompanied him to his tent in song and dance. As soon as he closed the flap to his tent he sat down nursing his hand. His son asked him: "Father, how did you withstand the pain?" His father answered: "It hurt like hell, but I knew that it was hurting him to the exact same extent. The truth is that had he held out for one more second, it would have been me pulling away first."
The Arabs appreciate the advantage of a drugged fighter: No fear, no need of nourishment, blind following of orders, and an ability to strike fear and despair upon an enemy through inhuman acts of terrorism.
One of the great ironies is the French military command after 1945 and DeGaulle's self imposed exile to Colombey-les-Deux-Églises once AGAIN tried to rebuild the Maginot Line thinking it would have relevance then to the Cold War. It was only after DeGaulle's return in 1959 and France's first nuclear test that the Maginot Line was once and finally scrapped for good. Remember a lot of the French military command OTHER than DeGaulle from 1945 to 1960 collaborated under Vichy initially and did not follow DeGaulle in 1940.
There is a great documentary from France Television featuring Francois Heisbourg among others discussing the huge changes in French military NOT after 1945 but only after 1960 and the advent of French nuclear weapons and just how overwhelmingly they were compared to the past.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dcOT9pLSeUs
Now the fact there was a period of time after the war but before the first French nuclear test that the Maginot line was still considered valuable perhaps showed that the original idea wasn't quite as bad as historians now make it out to be.
When Rommel came to the Meuse near Dinant, he found a bridge intact, with the French artillery on the heights above. He couldn’t believe his luck and rushed his tanks across the river, all the while expecting the French to wake up and wreck his plans. They never did (they were awaiting orders that never came). It was luck like this that favored the Germans throughout the campaign.
As for the French reaction, many saw Hitler as the savior of what they regarded as a hopeless societal malaise. Many others, my nanny among them, wanted no part of the fight between the foreigners and the French oligarchy. She owned a cafe frequented by resistance terrorists and the site of multiple German reprisals, yet like many, she never picked a side in a war that had nothing to do with her.
History is written by the victors and rarely resembles actual events. Events tend to be sloppy and messy and are almost never resolved one way or the other. But if we’re going to celebrate myths, you can’t do much better than the Allied version. Just don’t fight your next war on that basis.
Interesting, but I cannot see any resemblance between France in 1940 and USA now. True, both nations are overwhelmed be defeatism, but the Americans want to surrender Ukraine and Taiwan without a fight. Much more like Munich in 1938.
It doesn’t seem like a coincidence that 1938 was two years before 1940, does it?
Well, as I mentioned in my prefatory note, most of the factors bearing on France's defeat in 1940 were those commonly found in the annals of military history. While I suppose that the general malaise of French society exacerbated some of those factors, there was nothing unique about them. That was my main point. The British, for example, made much the same mistakes when it came to the role of the tank.
It was the French people's reaction to that defeat that revealed the larger problems. Also, I wanted to clear away some of the misconceptions about the 1940 Battle of France, concerning such things as the role of the Maginot Line and how well the French Army fought.
My name is Deep Turning, and I endorse this analogy.
It's the reaction to thing, not just the thing, that makes the difference.
More questions than statements.
The French political factions may have hated each other as much as they feared the Germans.
The political infighting from Munich to May, 1940 prevented a consensus - a focusing of the national energy.
I also got the sense that French communists were somewhat halfhearted in fighting the ally of Russia.
It seems that the very significant French defense budget didn't get the "bang for the buck", eg multiple airplane types with little standardization and a formidable navy that played no role in the war.
I wasn't impressed with the quality of French generals - with the exception of a few mid-level generals, there weren't as many "fighting generals" as a 1MM+ man army needed.
My sense is that the French defeat was due to a whole series of factors being negative at the same time. France may have overcome most of the negatives, but they lacked the leadership to bring the country together. I never heard a French version of "We shall fight on the beaches...".
And credit is due to the Germans, who fought well, had good tactics, competent generals, and got lucky. Few armies could have defeated the German army in May, 1940.
Agreed on all points, though I can think of counterfactuals bearing on the last of them, e.g. if Case Yellow had been executed in its original form.