Forever the Victim
On the master narrative of V. Putin's American apologists
Vladimer Putin’s American apologists are many, but not various. With no exception that I’ve noticed, they sing from the same hymnal, harp on the same string, strike the same note. The United States is evil, NATO threatens Russia’s national security, Ukraine is corrupt and full of Nazis. Oh, and did you know that “the West” has invaded Russia three times, in 1812, 1914, and 1941? It’s true! So how can Putin be blamed for his attack on Ukraine? It was nothing more than a response to an “existential threat.” Besides, even if NATO has no plans to attack Russia now, the future is unpredictable!
This was the comeback I received from one of the readers of my recent article, “Unprovoked Is a Damn Lie,” who argued as follows:
In 1789 France was no threat to Russia. Then a lot of completely unexpected and unpredictable changes happened and a very short time later French troops were in Russia in a way no one could have foreseen.
In 1913 Europe was at peace. Then, in a sudden reversal, Europe was at war and in no time German armies were in the Ukraine.
In 1929 Germany was militarily weak, and in a friendly relationship with Russia. There was no threat from Germany at all, none – and a mere twelve years later German soldiers were in Russia.
A statesman would have to be very stupid and completely ignorant of history to say “Everything is fine now, so I have no need whatever to be concerned about this strategically important territory and who controls it.”
The short rebuttal to this is to observe that historically, Russian peace of mind has come at a high price—to other nations and peoples. But let’s consider my critic’s historical examples in order, filling in the blanks as we proceed.
1789-1812
It’s true that at the time of the French Revolution, France posed no security threat to Russia. But a lot happened between 1789 and 1812, when Napoleon launched his invasion. The Revolution touched off a long series of wars, with Russia becoming involved in the War of the Second Coalition (1798-1802) against the French Republic. In that conflict, the Russian Army fought far from home, in the Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, and Greece. Russia again went to war against France as a member of the Third Coalition. The war of the same name raged from the spring of 1805 to the summer of 1806, the Russian Army participating in campaigns in Italy and Austria. There followed the War of the Fourth Coalition (1806-07), the Russian Army fighting the French on Prussian territory. Russia then made peace with France, and during the War of the Fifth Coalition (April-October 1809) was a French ally. Subsequently, a falling out between Napoleon and Tsar Alexander I prompted the French invasion of Russia (1812).
Actions have consequences. The Russian Empire was no innocent victim of Napoleonic aggression. After 1789, Russia involved itself in the affairs of Europe, sent its armies to fight on foreign fields, and eventually reaped the whirlwind.
1914-18
In 1914, it was Russia that invaded Germany. When the Great War broke out, the German military plan was to seek a decisive victory over France in the west, while standing on the defensive against Russia in the east. To take pressure off the scanty German forces defending East Prussia, the Austro-Hungarian Army was to launch an offensive from Galicia into the Ukraine, then part of Russia. The Russian war plan envisioned offensives against both the Germans and the Austrians. The outcome of this opening clash was a German victory over the Russians, and a Russian victory over the Austrians.
Once again, Russia was no innocent victim of German aggression. In 1914, the tsarist government chose war by coming to the defense of Serbia against Austria. Far from it being a response to an “existential threat,” the Russian decision for war was mainly influenced by considerations of prestige: the vindication of its holy, well-advertised responsibility to defend fellow Slavs. And once again, Russia reaped the whirlwind.
1939-41
Hitler’s decision to attack Poland was confirmed by the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, a treaty between National Socialist Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union. It was concluded on 23 August 1939, a mere nine days before Germany invaded Poland. The treaty was in the form of a non-aggression agreement, with a secret protocol establishing German and Russian spheres of influence in Europe. Poland was partitioned between the two countries. In line with the secret protocol, the USSR invaded Finland in late 1939 with a view to annexing that country. But the Finns put up such a spirited defense that Stalin thought again and contented himself with major territorial concessions. Next, the USSR occupied and annexed the Baltic States: Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia. Then Romania was intimidated into ceding (Bessarabia, the Hertsa region, and Northern Bukovina—the latter territory not included in the agreed-upon Soviet sphere of influence.
The Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact was an agreement between gangsters. Both Hitler and Stalin knew that war between them was inevitable. Believing that the USSR was not ready for war, Stalin needed time prepare his country for the coming conflict. Those preparations included pushing the USSR’s borders to the west, enslaving other peoples in the process. But for a third time, Russia reaped the whirlwind.
Russia’s Endless Quest for “Security”
This brings us to the Russo-Ukrainian War. My critic’s theory of the case is based on an implied claim that Russia had no choice in the matter of Ukraine. What else could Putin have done? Well, he could have pursued a policy of reconciliation, based on a frank acknowledgement of the tragic past and a turning of the page. But that’s not in the nature of the Russian despot and the regime he has built. The key to understanding them both is summed up in one word: humiliation. The USSR was the Russian Empire under the Red Flag, and its implosion demoted Russia from the rank of a great power with a world-historical mission.
Independent Ukraine is the central symbol of that humiliation. Both the tsars and the Bolsheviks believed that Russia without Ukraine could never be a great power; Putin agrees. Therefore, the Ukrainian national idea is a threat to the Motherland that must be stamped out by any means necessary. Under Putin, Russia’s ceaseless, neurotic quest for “security” is really an attempt to reestablish lost, mostly mythical, glories.
Contemporary Russian nationalism, therefore, is best understood as an angry, anguished protest against perceived historical injustices. The true culprits, of course, are Lenin and his heirs. The Bolshevik Revolution and the “building of socialism” destroyed old Russia—and when the USSR collapsed, nothing but rubble remained. But to acknowledge that reality would be to shoulder the blame for it. Germany’s grapple with its own terrible history shows how difficult such an examination of conscience can be for any nation. Under V. Putin, Russia has flunked that test.
Why should Russia’s resurrection come at the expense of other nations and peoples? Putin’s apologists in this country evade that question by portraying Russia as the victim, always and forever the target of Western aggression. Their disregard of history betrays the falsity of that claim.
Your column shows the difference between amateur historians and real historians.
To make your arguments requires many years of study (and thinking).
The huge benefit of the internet is to show glimpses of history that the intellectually curious can follow up on.
Russia cannot escape its character (or history).
I also have my doubts that Germany can escape its character (just watch the operations of a German commercial enterprise; the hierarchical and authoritarian tendencies continue).
My sense is that democracy is a mile wide and an inch deep in Germany.