Thank you again for clearing the air on this issue, especially to the rightward part of the political spectrum, with your deeply informed views (in such contrast to the blowhards of the alt-Right, views not held by even Trump).
One of the many ironies of the Russian-Ukraine war is that it has cleared away any serious contention that Russia's invasion has anything to do with NATO. As you wrote, it's about nothing but reassembling the Russo-Soviet imperium, a "lite" version with a new mafia-like nomenklatura and the commanding heights of the Russian economy (energy and other extractive industries) mostly back in the hands of the state. The hoped-for transformation of the 1990s -- Russia moving from empire to nationhood, a state-dominated to a largely private economy, and autocracy to greater democracy -- failed -- maybe failure was inevitable, maybe we were naive to think otherwise -- never happened.
The real problem is that the West hasn't provided enough lethal aid to hand Putin's head to him quickly enough. It's not surprising the Putin's toadies in the West are leading the outcry to prevent Ukraine from winning now that Russia has lost as badly as it has and to distract attention from how wrong they were. But Russia hasn't lost badly enough, not enough to force Putin to the negotiating table, once it's clear he can't get anything if he doesn't.
Why Russia failed to advance to the status of a democratic state is indeed a good question, and one with considerable bearing on the current crisis. I have some thoughts about that; perhaps I’ll make them the subject of a future article.
"Indeed, the average Russian voter appeared to genuinely believe that some degree of authoritarianism was beneficial for the country." - The delusional belief that Putin et al. rely on, avoiding the truth that the main vehicle of crime and corruption is the state itself.
The sad thing is that Russia has repeatedly exhibited the "weak society/strong state"-"weak state/strong society" syndrome. The last period of real hope in Russia was precisely when the state was weakening in the late 80s and 90s. Certain groups in Russian society benefit when the state is stronger and preys on society. This was obviously true under communism, but it's true now in a different way with the rise of the Russian mafia state.
"As for the charge that “interventionists” are pursuing “regime change,” this is a canard. If by chance Putin’s great miscalculation should lead to his ouster, who would miss him?" You make a very good point. The main purpose of western democracies assisting Ukraine is to preserve its freedom and territorial integrity, thereby preventing an illegal expansion of Russia territory and increase in its power to affect policy in Europe.
A putative win by Ukraine could be considered a win for "The West", but that is not the same as seeking regime change (or destroying Russia or Russian culture) as some RU propagandists claim). If the Putin regime - including Putin himself, of course - were to be replaced by something or someone else, that would be as a result of internal forces within Russia reacting to the Ukraine debacle that Putin brought on himself, not because European or American policy had regime change as its primary goal.
Thank you again for clearing the air on this issue, especially to the rightward part of the political spectrum, with your deeply informed views (in such contrast to the blowhards of the alt-Right, views not held by even Trump).
One of the many ironies of the Russian-Ukraine war is that it has cleared away any serious contention that Russia's invasion has anything to do with NATO. As you wrote, it's about nothing but reassembling the Russo-Soviet imperium, a "lite" version with a new mafia-like nomenklatura and the commanding heights of the Russian economy (energy and other extractive industries) mostly back in the hands of the state. The hoped-for transformation of the 1990s -- Russia moving from empire to nationhood, a state-dominated to a largely private economy, and autocracy to greater democracy -- failed -- maybe failure was inevitable, maybe we were naive to think otherwise -- never happened.
The real problem is that the West hasn't provided enough lethal aid to hand Putin's head to him quickly enough. It's not surprising the Putin's toadies in the West are leading the outcry to prevent Ukraine from winning now that Russia has lost as badly as it has and to distract attention from how wrong they were. But Russia hasn't lost badly enough, not enough to force Putin to the negotiating table, once it's clear he can't get anything if he doesn't.
Why Russia failed to advance to the status of a democratic state is indeed a good question, and one with considerable bearing on the current crisis. I have some thoughts about that; perhaps I’ll make them the subject of a future article.
https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/russia-great-transformational-failure
"Indeed, the average Russian voter appeared to genuinely believe that some degree of authoritarianism was beneficial for the country." - The delusional belief that Putin et al. rely on, avoiding the truth that the main vehicle of crime and corruption is the state itself.
The sad thing is that Russia has repeatedly exhibited the "weak society/strong state"-"weak state/strong society" syndrome. The last period of real hope in Russia was precisely when the state was weakening in the late 80s and 90s. Certain groups in Russian society benefit when the state is stronger and preys on society. This was obviously true under communism, but it's true now in a different way with the rise of the Russian mafia state.
https://www.amazon.com/Darkness-Dawn-Russian-Criminal-State-ebook/dp/B001VB5DL8 (from 2002!)
"As for the charge that “interventionists” are pursuing “regime change,” this is a canard. If by chance Putin’s great miscalculation should lead to his ouster, who would miss him?" You make a very good point. The main purpose of western democracies assisting Ukraine is to preserve its freedom and territorial integrity, thereby preventing an illegal expansion of Russia territory and increase in its power to affect policy in Europe.
A putative win by Ukraine could be considered a win for "The West", but that is not the same as seeking regime change (or destroying Russia or Russian culture) as some RU propagandists claim). If the Putin regime - including Putin himself, of course - were to be replaced by something or someone else, that would be as a result of internal forces within Russia reacting to the Ukraine debacle that Putin brought on himself, not because European or American policy had regime change as its primary goal.