I keep thinking about your description of the Dreyfus Affair. The over-the-top defrocking ceremony reminds me of the hundreds of J6 trials and the TV drama put on by the last democratic HR. When you know you’ve got a weak case, even if you believe in the underlying theme, you have to drown out your opponents and your own doubts with volume.
The Dreyfus Affair definitely broke the French intelligentsia, even without an extra push from a pandemic. So did the Boche victory at Sedan. When your social constructs are that weak and shallow, all it takes is a sigh to knock it all down. I don’t know if we’re there or not.
Has there ever been a republic so thoroughly set up to fail as the Weimar? The Allies thought that removal of the German tools of war would pacify them, but the greatest tool of all was the national character and consensus, which never much wavered between 1914 and 1945. Prosperity might have temporarily softened the desire for another round, just as defeat had soured it, but neither eliminated it.
I’m with your proposition that the French experience fits ours better than the German, but not because of a lack of a democratic tradition. All societies find a way to represent the popular will, either explicitly or via the organizations of the state. And the German popular will was clearly for a rematch. Hitler wasn’t so wildly popular because of some form of mass hypnosis, but because he delivered what the Germans wanted.
Actually, WWII wasn't that popular in Germany, nothing like 1914. Only victory over France in 1940 aroused real popular enthusiasm. The restoration of Germany's stature in Europe and ending various humiliations were certainly popular, but not launching a world war. The generals mostly thought Hitler was nuts, but they couldn't argue with his 1936-41 successes. Keep in mind the military was at the center of the 1944 plot against Hitler. By that time, of course, it was clear Germany would lose, and lose badly, not like 1918.
The rise and force of Nazism in the 1930s were a testimony to the power of a determined, fanatical minority facing weak organized opposition, which was badly divided in any case. This seizure of power in 1933-34, like Mussolini's in 1922-24, had an example to imitate, Lenin's coup against the Kerensky government in late 1917. Again, the power of a determined, fanatical minority faced with a weak, disorganized opposition. Europe by the end of WWI and afterwards was a broken civilization.
The very real reluctance of the 1939 German in the street wasn’t a desire to avoid war, but a lack of confidence in the outcome. The Soviet pact fixed that. And your description of the seizure of power applies to the Bolsheviks, but not the Nazis. Hitler was backed by a large popular following, even if not big enough to put him over the top. Hindenburg’s blessing fixed that and, with the popular reaction, sidelined the generals as a political force. But we’re hijacking the article here, the point being that the French experience parallels ours much more effectively than the German. I can’t argue with that.
With the 1933 cabinet, I simply meant the internal coup aspect. No doubt, the Bolsheviks were far less popular.
The Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 certainly ended the prospect of a two-front war. But the outbreak of actual war did not see the mass enthusiasm of August 1914.
And yes, the French parallel is much more a propos.
Those people in 1914 expected a quick strike and a French collapse, as in 1870. The Germans in 1939 knew better, but then the Polish campaign convinced them. The reason I keep harping on this is that we can’t blame the war and its ugliness on a tiny cabal. The entire nation was in on the crimes, right down to the holocaust. Any denial of responsibility is as weak as me claiming that I can’t be held responsible for my medium rare steak because I never visited an abattoir.
I keep thinking about your description of the Dreyfus Affair. The over-the-top defrocking ceremony reminds me of the hundreds of J6 trials and the TV drama put on by the last democratic HR. When you know you’ve got a weak case, even if you believe in the underlying theme, you have to drown out your opponents and your own doubts with volume.
The Dreyfus Affair definitely broke the French intelligentsia, even without an extra push from a pandemic. So did the Boche victory at Sedan. When your social constructs are that weak and shallow, all it takes is a sigh to knock it all down. I don’t know if we’re there or not.
Has there ever been a republic so thoroughly set up to fail as the Weimar? The Allies thought that removal of the German tools of war would pacify them, but the greatest tool of all was the national character and consensus, which never much wavered between 1914 and 1945. Prosperity might have temporarily softened the desire for another round, just as defeat had soured it, but neither eliminated it.
I’m with your proposition that the French experience fits ours better than the German, but not because of a lack of a democratic tradition. All societies find a way to represent the popular will, either explicitly or via the organizations of the state. And the German popular will was clearly for a rematch. Hitler wasn’t so wildly popular because of some form of mass hypnosis, but because he delivered what the Germans wanted.
Actually, WWII wasn't that popular in Germany, nothing like 1914. Only victory over France in 1940 aroused real popular enthusiasm. The restoration of Germany's stature in Europe and ending various humiliations were certainly popular, but not launching a world war. The generals mostly thought Hitler was nuts, but they couldn't argue with his 1936-41 successes. Keep in mind the military was at the center of the 1944 plot against Hitler. By that time, of course, it was clear Germany would lose, and lose badly, not like 1918.
The rise and force of Nazism in the 1930s were a testimony to the power of a determined, fanatical minority facing weak organized opposition, which was badly divided in any case. This seizure of power in 1933-34, like Mussolini's in 1922-24, had an example to imitate, Lenin's coup against the Kerensky government in late 1917. Again, the power of a determined, fanatical minority faced with a weak, disorganized opposition. Europe by the end of WWI and afterwards was a broken civilization.
The very real reluctance of the 1939 German in the street wasn’t a desire to avoid war, but a lack of confidence in the outcome. The Soviet pact fixed that. And your description of the seizure of power applies to the Bolsheviks, but not the Nazis. Hitler was backed by a large popular following, even if not big enough to put him over the top. Hindenburg’s blessing fixed that and, with the popular reaction, sidelined the generals as a political force. But we’re hijacking the article here, the point being that the French experience parallels ours much more effectively than the German. I can’t argue with that.
With the 1933 cabinet, I simply meant the internal coup aspect. No doubt, the Bolsheviks were far less popular.
The Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 certainly ended the prospect of a two-front war. But the outbreak of actual war did not see the mass enthusiasm of August 1914.
And yes, the French parallel is much more a propos.
Those people in 1914 expected a quick strike and a French collapse, as in 1870. The Germans in 1939 knew better, but then the Polish campaign convinced them. The reason I keep harping on this is that we can’t blame the war and its ugliness on a tiny cabal. The entire nation was in on the crimes, right down to the holocaust. Any denial of responsibility is as weak as me claiming that I can’t be held responsible for my medium rare steak because I never visited an abattoir.