Last week, we were treated to a wave of scare headlines concerning Russia’s massive new military mobilization and its plans for a spring offensive in Ukraine. On the Drudge Report there appeared a map showing large arrows slashing out of Russia, deep into Ukrainian territory. This news was accompanied by renewed threats from Moscow that continued NATO assistance to Ukraine could result in retaliation, possibly nuclear.
Whatever V. Putin’s deficiencies as a military strategist, he knows how to push the buttons of squishes in the West who would like to see the Russo-Ukrainian war just…go away. From the usual suspects came the usual demands for a US-led diplomatic offensive to bring the conflict to an end, the usual complaints that Ukraine is a corrupt country that doesn’t really deserve support against Russia, and the usual warnings that continuing such support intensifies the risk of “escalation.”
This article by Michael Brendan Dougherty at National Review Online is typical of the attitude being taken by opponents of the war who fancy themselves to be responsible critics. In tones of sweet reason, it outlines a policy not only unrealistic in root and branch but disturbingly cynical. This passage gives the flavor of the whole:
Instead of seeking to help Ukraine win the war, or letting U.S. officials speculate about Putin’s demise, I would have been satisfied to make any gains for Russia just a misery—roughly the same way the Communists helped make Vietnam miserable for us, and we made Afghanistan miserable for Russia. The one argument that seemed to make any impression on Vladimir Putin is that he risked becoming as hated by the world as George W. Bush was. Hostile occupation tends to dissuade further military adventurism.
In other words, Mr. Dougherty would be satisfied if Putin’s invasion had led to an occupation of broad swathes of Ukrainian territory, thus provoking an insurgency that would make the despot look bad and give him “misery.” That the real burden of such misery would be borne by the Russian and especially the Ukrainian people seems of slight concern to the writer. But an insurgency, sir, is not a dinner party.
Notions of this kind come easily to armchair strategists and third parties comfortable in the knowledge that they need not fear the miseries of war. No one is coming to destroy their homes, to kill their sons and daughters, to ravage the soil and extinguish the independence of their country. These horrors have never touched them. The reality of war—its destruction and bloodshed, its mental atmosphere—is incomprehensible to them.
The Prussian philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz, described war as “a fascinating trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; the play of chance and probability, within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to pure reason.” It’s that “blind natural force” that people like Mr. Dougherty disregard. It’s why “good-faith negotiations” to reach “an equitable settlement” of the Russo-Ukrainian War are at present impossible. For neither side is this conflict a “war of choice” ruled by the principle of limited liability; both belligerents believe themselves to be fighting a war for survival. Why the Ukrainians see it that way is, or ought to be, obvious. Putin has made no bones about his real objective: to destroy Ukraine as an independent, sovereign state. Meanwhile, on the Russian side, each battlefield setback has raised the stakes: What originated as a war of choice has come to be seen by the regime as a struggle to preserve its hold on power.
This brings us to the present moment, and Putin’s threat of a massive new military mobilization. There’s probably less to this than meets the eye. As I’ve noted previously (see here and here) Russia’s military power is more apparent than real. The number of troops, tanks, guns, missile launchers, etc. may seem impressive. But that dismal branch of military art and science, logistics, determines what percentage of those resources can be deployed and supported in the theater of war. Modern ground combat consumes enormous quantities of material of all kinds—vehicles, weapons, ammunition, fuel, repair parts, food, medical supplies. Given its poor performance thus far, it seems doubtful that the Russian armed forces’ logistical infrastructure could support major reinforcements in the zone of operations. At best, the forces already in place might be refitted and brought up to strength.
There have been reports that the Russians will resort to their traditional tactics of the human wave: throwing in masses of troops that would overwhelm Ukrainian defenses. This, indeed, was successful against the Germans in World War II. But the Red Army’s success was built on three factors: overwhelming numerical superiority; a ruthless disregard for the inevitable, enormous casualties; and an equally ruthless enforcement of discipline in the ranks. None of these factors are operable in Putin’s Russia. The despot himself may admire Stalin, but he has not the power to make Stalin’s technique effective. If he tries, as he might, the result for Russia would be a massacre to rival the Battle of the Somme.
This war, I believe, will go on until one side or the other reaches its breaking point—just as the Great War went on and on despite ever-increasing slaughter and destruction, until the Central Powers reached their breaking point in 1918. A grim feature of that war was the way in which each sanguinary battle, from the opening round in 1914 to the very end, raised the stakes, spawned violently extremist war aims, and intensified mutual hatreds. Every defeat made total victory seem the more essential; only the exhaustion of Germany and its allies brought the machinery of death to a stop.
Everybody knows that if any war can be called just, the Ukrainian people’s defense of their country in the face of brutal, unprovoked aggression merits that label. Everybody knows that the Russian armed forces in Ukraine have committed countless war crimes. Everybody knows that Putin’s claims concerning the threat posed to Russia by NATO are garbage. NATO poses no threat to Russia—but it does bar the way to Putin’s long-range objective, the recreation of a Russian imperium in Easter Europe. US and NATO support for Ukraine is thus justified on both strategic and moral grounds. The list of America’s vital national interests includes the principle that aggression must not be allowed to prosper. Giving Putin what he wants, or even part of what he wants, would be a costly and cowardly mistake, reverberating ominously around the world.
But can Ukraine win? I think so—though the definition of victory remains to be framed. The Ukrainian government’s official position is that the war will go on until all occupied territory, including Crimea, is liberated. Whether this is possible I cannot say. The answer is likely to come later this year, when both sides make what I suspect will be their final bid for victory—and when, I predict, one side or the other will reach its breaking point. The next six months will tell the tale.