Just now the media are full of breathless speculation concerning the impending Israeli attack on Hamas in the Gaza Strip. What’s the holdup? What haven’t the Israeli Defense Forces gone in yet? Has Bibi blinked?
To state the obvious, there are many factors affecting the decision to launch a major military operation: some political, some diplomatic, some military. It’s quite possible, for instance, that the IDF is holding off to give as many Palestinians as possible a chance to move to relatively safe areas in southern Gaza. It’s possible that behind-the-scenes diplomatic initiatives are being given their chance to play out. It’s certainly possible that because of President Biden’s impending visit to the region, the Israeli government has decided to postpone the attack.
But however plausible these reasons may appear, they’re in the realm of speculation. In the military sphere, however, there are far less speculative reasons why the ground assault on Gaza hasn’t happened yet.
One: Mobilization. In response to the Hamas pogrom in southern Israel, the IDF has undertaken its largest military mobilization since the 1973 Yom Kippur War—probably the largest in Israel’s history. Around 350,000 reservists have been recalled to the colors. These men and women have to be processed, assigned to existing units, or formed into new units. No doubt the IDF is well practiced in such procedures, but they still take time.
Two: Deployment. Once formed and passed fit for active service, units need to be moved to their deployment areas in the south and north of Israel. An American football analogy may be useful here: in the south, an offensive lineup; in the north a defensive lineup. The IDF command must determine what forces of what type are required for each front.
In the north, the IDF will probably opt for an active defense: cross-border air, missile and artillery strikes to disrupt Hezbollah forces, with battle groups standing in readiness to conduct counterattacks against any enemy attempt to enter Israel. In the face of such a defense, Hezbollah could still make trouble in the north but would be incapable of launching a major ground invasion. The group’s leadership and its Iranian sponsors no doubt realize that in a standup fight with the IDF, Hezbollah would come in second.
In the south, the military problem facing the IDF is far more difficult. Fighting over urban terrain is a challenging assignment for even the best-trained and experienced troops. Therefore, preparation of the battlefield is an essential preliminary to a ground assault. The most visible sign of these preparatory operations is the air, missile and artillery bombardment of Hamas targets in Gaza. But it’s likely that Israeli troops are already operating in Gaza: special forces teams charged with reconnaissance and surveillance along the planned avenues of attack. These operations on the ground are of course being supplemented by air reconnaissance and signals intelligence.
Three: Logistics. Large-scale modern warfare consumes resources, human and material, at a prodigious rate. Ensuring that such resources are available and ready to hand is the business of those unsung heroes of the army: the logisticians. Dumping ammunition, fuel, repair parts, food, water and much else in forward positions, arranging for evacuation of the dead, wounded and prisoners of war, flowing replacement troops and equipment to combat units—all these arrangements must be perfected before the attack goes in. It’s a job that demands detailed preparations, flexibility in execution, and time.
Four: Planning. Planning a military operation is a dynamic process. Initially, a basic mission statement is formulated, with broad objectives being specified. But the details are subject to change as intelligence flows in and the staff builds up a picture of the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and likely intentions. This in turn may require the modification of operational orders already issued to combat units. The aim is to maintain clarity concerning the basic mission and objectives, while allowing for sufficient flexibility as the battle develops.
A point to bear in mind is that these four factors are interactive. Planning, for instance, is affected by mobilization and logistics factors, deployments are affected by the dynamic planning process, and so on. This is the three-dimensional military chess problem with which the IDF is grappling. And solving it is a race against the clock—for in war, time is the one resource that once expended, can never be replenished.
How does one email you?
Don't mean to trivialize the effort, but think back to the last time that you went camping.
Picking the area, getting your gear out of storage, refurbishing worn items, buying missing items, planning and then reviewing the plans.
Takes us days to organize.
Now multiply that for 350,000 soldiers, where the consequences of error can be death rather than having to eat chili&rice three days in a row.
It is a testament to military capabilities that they can launch inside of two weeks.