Defining Victory

A negotiated settlement of the Ukrainian war must be predicated on Russia's defeat

Why is this man smiling…?

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In a comment on Claire Berlinski’s interview with the Nigerian journalist Philip Obaji, who detailed the atrocities being committed by Russian mercenary soldiers in the Central African Republic and elsewhere in Africa, I said the following:

My initial reaction to this important and disturbing story is that the best course of action for America and its allies is to make sure that Russia is defeated in Ukraine. While I agree that the conflict is a global one, its center of gravity right now is in Eastern Europe.

This comment, which I also shared to Substack Notes, brought the usual comeback from one of the usual suspects: How would you define victory? The question was of course designed to put me on the spot, it being axiomatic in appeasement circles that Ukraine can never hope to regain all the territory that is currently occupied by Russia. But in fact, it’s not complicated. I define victory as the defeat of the Russian armed forces, leading to a peace settlement that compels Russia to disgorge its ill-gotten gains.

For America, the Russo-Ukrainian War has receded into the background in recent months—understandably, perhaps, given crisis in the Middle East and the dramatic political developments of this tumultuous election year. But what has happened since the spring and summer of 2023, when the highly anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive failed to produce decisive results? Essentially, the war settled into a stalemate.

Since February of this year, Russian forces have been attacking in eastern Ukraine, with the objective of seizing that portion of Donetsk Oblast that remains under Ukrainian control. The Russians have made slow progress against a debilitated Ukrainian defense, but so far there has been no decisive Russian breakthrough, and the Ukrainians are retiring on urban areas that will be easier to defend that the more open terrain farther east.

According to the Institute for the Study of War, these attacks, which have been costly for the Russians, are probably intended to fix the defenders in place, constraining their ability to build up forces for a large-scale counteroffensive. Manpower and equipment shortages have compounded the problem for the Ukrainians, making it difficult to replaces losses, and lowing the rate at which new units can be activated.

But on the other hand, Purin seems to have given up on his ambitions to turn Ukraine into a vassal state of Russia. As things stand now, his forces can hold what they have and make incremental advances. What they can’t do is deliver a knockout blow that would cause a general collapse of Ukrainian resistance. The Russian Army lacks the operational and tactical flexibility necessary to make the most of its numerical superiority. Its losses since the beginning of the war have been high, and though equipment can be replaced out of reserve stocks, well-trained manpower is in short supply.

In short, Russia is conducting a prevent defense that Ukraine has not the resources to overcome. Putin’s obvious intention is to prolong the war until America and Europe’s patience is exhausted and they force Ukraine to accept a peace deal that would allow the aggressor to retain his ill-gotten gains.

And that, of course, is precisely where the friends of Ukraine are headed. At a moment when full material, diplomatic, and moral support would make all the difference, America and Europe are dithering.

The Biden Administration, in a characteristic demonstration of disorganized thinking, confuses winning the war with ending the war—but the two objectives are at all not equivalent. Victory is hard work; ending a war, however, is easy if you’re prepared to lose. The besetting sin of postwar liberal foreign policy is the notion that such realities can be talked away.

Admittedly, this is true in some cases. A fisheries dispute between the United States and Canada will eventually be resolved by negotiations because the fish are not worth fighting over. But once war has begun talk, if not cheap, is devalued. Long ago, Frederick the Great summed up the reality: “Diplomacy without armed force is like a musical score without instruments.” Your arguments may be cogent. The justice of your cause may be obvious. The international community may be on your side. But if you’re losing the war logic, justice, and international support count for nothing.

An end to the Russo-Ukrainian War on favorable terms for Ukraine, Europe, and America therefore requires a significant, clearly decisive military victory by Ukraine over Russia. It need not be a victory so large as to bring about Russia’s unconditional surrender. It could be, for example, the repulse of a major Russian offensive, followed by a Ukrainian counteroffensive large and powerful enough to rout the attackers with heavy losses and pose a threat to Russian territory. A severe military setback would be a shock to the system, calling the very legitimacy of the regime into question—and V. Putin has a well-cultivated sense of survival.

But for this to be possible, Ukraine must receive from America and Europe all the material support necessary to replace losses, equip new units, and upgrade the capabilities of its armed forces. Equally essential is the removal of all restrictions on the use of the weapons provided to Ukraine. No such limitations constrain Russia, which conducts attacks on Ukraine as it pleases. To impose them on Ukraine for fear of “escalation” is an absurdity. Wars are won by escalation, not by restraint.

Whether any such changes of policy are possible at this stage of the war is, however, a doubtful question. Thanks to President Joe Biden’s obvious incapacity, the US government is essentially headless, muddling along from day to day with no clear sense of direction. And without American leadership, the rest of NATO can hardly be expected to fill the gap.

Nor is it likely that the outcome of the impending US presidential election will revolutionize this sorry situation. Neither Kamala Harris nor Donald Trump would be willing to take a hard line against Russia. Both seem convinced that V. Putin can be talked around, and to that end both would put pressure on Ukraine to make concessions so that the war can be ended.

So when everything’s said and done, Putin will probably get away with his brutal act of aggression. And the conclusion he draws from that success no doubt will echo that of an earlier and even more odious despot: “Our enemies are little worms. I saw them at Munich.”