D-Day East
If China invades Taiwan: an assessment (Part Two)
In Part One of this article, I outlined the historical precedent that I believe to be most relevant to an evaluation of a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan: D-Day, 6 June 1944. Operation Overlord and the subsequent Battle of Normandy constitute the only campaign in military history comparable in scale and complexity to an invasion of Taiwan.
(See here for an interactive map of Taiwan and surrounding areas.)
For the People’s Liberation Army, victory would depend on (1) a successful landing on Taiwan, (2) consolidation of a beachhead large enough to accommodate a buildup of forces, and (3) a breakout followed by a battle ending with a decisive defeat of the defending forces. For the Taiwanese defenders, success would depend on (1) repelling the invasion attempt, or (2) preventing the consolidation of the beachhead, or (3) preventing a buildup of enemy forces, or (4) severing the supply lines between mainland China and the invasion force on Taiwan.
For the invader therefore, victory would depend on the fulfillment of all three conditions, while the defender would have four opportunities to turn the tide.
In June 1944, the German defenders had but one realistic chance of defeating the Allied invasion, by crushing it on the beaches. This they failed to do. Poor intelligence, Allied deception efforts and air superiority, plus disagreements and confusion at high levels of the German command threw that chance away. Thereafter it proved impossible for the German Army to prevent the consolidation and expansion of the Allied beachheads and the buildup of their forces. In Part One I mentioned Hitler’s refusal to authorize a pullback from the coastal zone and his veto on using the V-1 cruise missile against the Allied beachhead and ports of embarkation in England. These measures might have bought the German Army time and enabled it to conduct a more orderly withdrawal, but they could not have prevented the ultimate loss of France.
However, looking at an invasion of Taiwan from the attacker’s point of view, the situation seems somewhat less favorable than it was for the Allies in 1944.
Intelligence and Planning
The element of surprise—or to be more precise, the effect of surprise—is the sine qua non of a successful offensive operation. But any attempt to deceive the Taiwanese command as to the timing or target of the invasion would likely fail. It can be assumed that the Taiwanese military has good intelligence concerning PLA force deployments and movements across the Taiwan Straits. The buildup necessary in preparation for an invasion would be impossible to conceal in any case. A great deal of shipping would have to be concentrated in the ports of embarkation, troops would have to be moved in from their permanent stations, supplies would have to be dumped forward, etc. In short, the signs that something big was impending would be too obvious to overlook. And besides its own intelligence capabilities, Taiwan could rely on those of the United States and its regional allies.
Probably, therefore, the PLA will rely on massive initial air and missile strikes to replicate the effects of surprise: shock and disorganization.
As with the Allies in 1944, a key decision for the PLA command would be the selection of an invasion area. Geographically, the island of Taiwan is divided into three zones. From west to east, these are: a western coastal plain, a mountainous central spine, and a narrow, mostly hilly, eastern strip. (See the interactive map) The western coastal plain, facing the Chinese mainland, is widest in the south, progressively narrowing to the north. Here are located most of the country’s major urban areas and population. The capital, Taipei City, lies at the northern extremity of the western coastal zone, bordered by the Xindian River to the south and the Tamsui River to the west. The city is located on low-lying terrain, but it is hemmed in on all sides by hills and low-lying mountains. It can only be approached by sea via the Tamsui River. Adjacent coastal areas have only narrow strips of level terrain—insufficient for the development of a large beachhead. It seems unlikely, therefore, that the PLA would make its main invasion effort in the north. Commando operations to decapitate the Taiwanese government and military command, cannot, however, be ruled out.
Farther south, the coastal plain is wider and there are several major ports. Just as the Allies selected Normandy with the idea of capturing the port of Cherbourg, it seems likely that the PLA would select an invasion area with space to develop a beachhead and proximity to port facilities. One possibility is the area south of Taichung, which is Taiwan’s second-largest city and a major port. An invasion in this area, perhaps in conjunction with a special operation to seize Taichung’s port facilities by an airborne coup de main, is a plausible option for the invader. Control of the port would greatly facilitate a buildup of forces, and a bridgehead in this area would give PLA forces access to the coastal plain’s dense north-south road net.
It seems likely, therefore, that the invasion would strike at some point along the south-central portion of Taiwan’s western coastal plain.
Initial Operations
As mentioned above, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be preceded by massive air and missile strikes, a “hurricane bombardment” reminiscent of those that preceded the last great Western Front offensives of the German Army in World War One—albeit on a much larger scale. Its primary objective would be the same: to stun the defenders, disrupt their command and control network, and destroy key targets like airfields and other fixed military installations. A secondary objective would be to spread disorder and panic by destroying key civilian infrastructure such as power plants and other utilities, telecommunications, etc.
The invasion itself would be spearheaded by the PLA Navy Marine Corps. This force totals some 40,000 troops organized in six combined arms brigades plus various support units (artillery, combat engineers, aviation, etc.) There is also a brigade-sized commando unit. A combined arms brigade has about 6,000 troops and is equipped with a variety of amphibious armored fighting vehicles, both tracked and wheeled. Follow-on forces would be drawn from the PLA Ground Force, which maintains six amphibious combined armed brigades, larger and with heavier equipment than the Marine brigades. Together, these twelve brigades constitute about 15% of the total number of combined arms brigades in the PLA force structure.
The PLA Navy has a sizeable force of amphibious warfare ships, of which the largest and most versatile are three helicopter carriers (LPH) and eight amphibious transport dock ships (LPD). These vessels can land a battalion-sized force by helicopter, air cushion vehicles, and conventional landing craft. The LPD, for example, can accommodate 800 troops and up to 60 vehicles. The LPHs and LPDs are backed up by a large fleet of smaller landing ships and minor landing craft. It appears, therefore, that the PLA has the capabilities necessary to transport an invasion force across the Taiwan Strait and put it ashore.
Sustaining the invasion force in combat and bringing in follow-on forces, however, is another matter. Modern combat consumes ammunition, fuel, repair parts, food, etc. at a prodigious rate, and until port facilities could be captured, all supplies would have to be delivered over the beach. Reinforcements in the form of heavy combined arms brigades (equipped with main battle tanks and tracked infantry fighting vehicles), medium combined arms brigades (equipped with light tanks and wheeled infantry fighting vehicles), and combat support units such as artillery and rocket artillery battalions, air defense battalions, heavy combat engineer battalions, logistics units, etc.) would have to be transported by requisitioned civilian ships, preferably roll-on/roll-off cargo vessels, which also require port facilities. And of course, the larger the force ashore, the greater the demand for logistical support.
Conclusion
In 1944, the Germans had scant ability to disrupt the Allied buildup once the latter had secured their beachhead. Today, however, the existence of long-range, precision-guided standoff weapons poses a serious threat to an amphibious invasion. Not only the initial lift of troops but the supplies needed to sustain them and the reinforcements necessary to effectuate a breakout could only come by sea across the Taiwan Strait. Thus in all likelihood, the outcome of the “battle of the beachhead” would be decisive for the whole campaign. How that battle might develop will be analyzed in Part Three of this article.
Very interesting comparison of the D-Day invasion and a theoretical invasion of Taiwan. I hope you will consider publishing a likely scenario from the standpoint of the defenders, that is, what countermeasures could be used to obstruct/surround/destroy the attacking force.