A Critique of Pure Reason

Clausewitz's "fascinating trinity" makes sense of the Russo-Ukrainian War

The Ukrainian people mourn their dead soldiers

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Last Friday night, FNC’s Greg Gutfeld led off his show with a hymn of praise for Donald Trump—who’d just proposed himself, with the usual Barnum & Bailey flourishes, as the honest broker who could bring the Russo-Ukrainian War to an end. To summarize Gutfeld’s opening monologue: The hapless Joe Biden won’t do it— probably he couldn’t do it—but Trump the Dealmaker has what it takes to hammer out a compromise peace plan acceptable to both sides!

One’s instinct is of course to dismiss Trump’s bombastic self-promotion and Gutfeld’s light-minded cheerleading. But leaving the theatrics and the yucks to one side, might Trump have the right idea? Is it possible that a diplomatic overture by the United States and NATO is all that’s needed to stop the fighting?

In his celebrated treatise on war, Carl von Clausewitz described it as “a fascinating trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; the play of chance and probability, within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to pure reason.” Those who think that diplomacy can bring the Russo-Ukrainian War to an end are betting on that last element—it must be said, to the exclusion of the other two.

Clausewitz treated war as a political, social and cultural phenomenon, and he sought to distinguish those aspects of it that are timeless from those that are transitory. Hence his conception of the trinity, which sums up war’s timeless, therefore fundamental, characteristics. And by applying it as a template to the present war, we can see where Trump, Gutfeld and other people who place their faith in a diplomatic solution have gone wrong. It comes down to a matter of timing.

“Pure reason,” indeed, dictates that Russia and Ukraine should immediately stop fighting and go into conference, resolving their differences with a little give here, a little take there. It also implies that other parties to the conflict should step in and impose a settlement if the principals are recalcitrant. In practical terms, this would probably mean a US-led negotiation with Russia over Ukraine’s head. The friends of Ukraine would make the best deal possible on its behalf—adding, sotto voce, Take it or leave it.

Now if rational calculation were the only factor in play, a scheme like that might work. But it slights the other elements of the trinity, which are co-equal with pure reason and interact with it over the course of a war.

Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the great destruction wrought thereby, the countless war crimes committed by Russian soldiers, have roused the hatred and enmity of the Ukrainian people. Atavistic passions have been unleashed. The noble impulse to defend one’s homeland is accompanied by a base but understandable desire for revenge. On the other side, the war has brought to a boil the crude, violent, self-pitying nationalism so characteristic of post-Soviet Russia. Announcing the annexation of big chunks of eastern Ukraine, V. Putin indulged in a lunatic rant that cast Russia as the noble defender of civilization against the West—which somehow manages to be both decadent and all-powerful.

The stormy emotions on both sides mute the voice of pure reason; they make demands on political and military leaders that cannot be satisfied by rational calculation alone.

Diplomacy—pure reason in action—also depends on a body of agreed-upon facts. But at this stage of the Russo-Ukrainian War, such facts are lacking. Thanks to the play of chance and probability, one set of facts has already become obsolete. The combat power of the Russian armed forces was greatly overrated at the beginning of the war, while Ukraine’s ability to defend itself was greatly underestimated. So instead of enjoying a swift victory, Russia experienced a series of humiliating setbacks that culminated in the abandonment of its attempt to capture Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital.

Now Ukraine is on the offensive, and Russia is struggling to hold what it has. Lurking in the background is the possibility that Putin, desperate to stave off a humiliating defeat, will resort to the use of nuclear weapons, with all the incalculable consequences thereunto appertaining. Responding to a threat of that magnitude with a plea for negotiations could well make a bad situation worse by emboldening the Russian despot. A new set of facts is emerging day by day, but its details remain unclear. Political and military leaders must therefore grapple with probabilities, uncertainties, and unanswerable questions as they draw up their plans and issue their orders.

This is not to argue that diplomacy is futile, just that its time is not yet. The Russo-Ukrainian War, which has raged for almost eight months now, cannot now be stopped before it has run its course. But like all wars, this one will end. Eventually, one side or the other will reach the limit of its endurance. Perhaps Ukrainian morale will collapse. Perhaps the Russian Army will mutiny. Perhaps a coup will remove Putin, replacing him with a government determined to cut Russia’s losses. Thereupon Clausewitz’s trinity of war will rebalance itself, a fresh body of agreed-upon facts will emerge, and the diplomats will then have something with which to work.

May that moment come sooner rather than later.